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FEDERALLY SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL
KIDNAPPING: AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE
TO EXTRADITION?
In terrorism prosecutions, the issue is not gathering evidence, like in other
criminal cases, but in getting the defendants and doing something about it.'
Mr. Barcella's statement summarizes the shared goals and frustrations
of the international community in dealing with terrorism.2 Although
nations can employ international law and formal extradition procedures
to gain custody over common criminals,3 most states refuse to permit the
extradition of political offenders.4 Terrorists have attempted to blur the
distinction between political offenses and common crimes by cloaking
fundamentally criminal activities under a mantle of political legitimacy.
In so doing, terrorists take advantage of the lack of consensus among
sovereign nations as to what constitutes an extraditable offense and thus
escape formal rendition.5 In response to this tactic, the United States has
considered bypassing formal extradition procedures in favor of kidnap-
ping terrorists in order to bring them to justice.6
This Note examines the desirability of state-sponsored kidnapping as
1. E. Lawrence Barcella Jr., Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia,
quoted in U.S. Wrestles with Idea of Abducting Terrorists, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Jan. 20, 1986, at
Bi, col. I [hereinafter cited as Post Dispatch].
2. No universally accepted definition of "terrorism" exists. See INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AND POLITICAL CRIMES XIV (M. Bassiouni ed. 1975) (defining international terrorism as
"[i]ndividual or coercive conduct employing strategies of terror-violence which contain an interna-
tional element or are directed against an internationally protected target and whose aim is to pro-
duce a power oriented outcome.") [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM]. See also 1984
Act to Combat International Terrorism, § 3071, 18 U.S.C. § 3077(1) (1985) (defining terrorism).
3. See FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 487-88 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1984) [hereinafter cited as FOREIGN RELATIONS] (INTERPOL links national police forces in 138
nations to identify and arrest criminal fugitives). "Extradition is the process by which a person
charged with or convicted of a crime under the law of one state is arrested in another state and
returned for trial or punishment to the state under whose law he has been charged or convicted." Id.
at 63.
4. See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
5. Under extradition treaties, nations often reserve the right to determine whether the alleged
criminal act constitutes a political offense. French courts have refused to extradite United States
nationals charged with hijacking because the hijackers claimed membership in the Black Panther
movement. See FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 88. See also infra note 16. See generally V.
WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION (1980); Abramovsky & Ea-
gie, United States Policy in Apprehending Alleged Offenders Abroad: Extradition, Abduction or Irreg-
ular Rendition?, 57 OR. L. REV. 51 (1977).
6. See Post Dispatch, supra note 1.
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an alternative to extradition. Part I analyzes extradition law and exposes
its shortcomings when applied to terrorist activities. Part II considers
judicial treatment of kidnapping as a means to gain jurisdiction. Part III
concludes that, although government-sponsored kidnapping is an appeal-
ing alternative, it is neither a legal nor ultimately desirable substitute for
formal extradition.
I. EXTRADITION
Sovereign nations long have relied on some form of extradition to ob-
tain custody over alleged criminals seeking refuge in other states.' Until
recently, governments viewed extradition as a moral duty and freely
granted extradition requests.' Today, however, nations only grant extra-
dition when mutual extradition treaties obligate them to do so.' Most
extradition treaties require some showing that the alleged offender com-
mitted an act that both states recognize as criminal, that the crime con-
stitutes an extraditable offense, 10 and that the requesting state has
jurisdiction over the offender."
7. The first extradition treaty the United States signed was the Treaty of Amity, Commerce
and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105. After the
expiration of this treaty in 1806, the United States waited until 1842 to again enter an extradition
treaty, also with Great Britain. Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, United States-Great Brit-
ain, 8 Stat. 572, T.S. No. 119.
8. See FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 64.
9. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) ("the principles of international law
recognize no right to extradition apart from treaty"); Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker,
299 U.S. 5 (1936) (noting that in the absence of an extradition treaty expressly authorizing extradi-
tion in the situation, an individual cannot be extradited). Extradition treaties are premised on adher-
ence to "reciprocity," by which sovereign nations exchange mutual extradition favors. See generally
1. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1971); M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRAcTICE (1983).
10. An extradition treaty may enumerate the specific crimes for which an individual may be
extradited. Alternatively, such treaties may adopt standard of proof requirements to determine if an
individual can be extradited. See Note, The Jaffe Case and the Use of International Kidnapping as an
A4lternative to Extradition, 14 GA. J. INT'L. AND COMP. L., 357, 363 (1984). The formulation of the
standard of proof required to justify extradition may vary between nations. See FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, supra note 3, at 77.
The "double criminality" requirement poses obvious problems. For example, treaties between the
United States and South American nations do not include narcotics offenses as extraditable offenses.
See Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 5, at 51 n. 1. See also Jacob, International Extradition: Impli-
cations of the Sister Case, 59 YALE L.J. 622, 622 n.3 (noting an English court's refusal to extradite a
German national to stand trial for peijury in the United States because the individual's actions did
not constitute perjury under British law).
11. See infra notes 26-58 and accompanying text. In addition, the "specialty doctrine" requires
the requesting state to try the alleged offender only for those crimes for which he was extradited, see
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss4/7
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A. The Political Offense Exception
Until the nineteenth century, states used extradition almost exclusively
against political and religious offenders rather than common criminals.12
Since then, however, the world climate of political and religious toler-
ance has transformed extradition from "a means of international political
repression [to] . . . a method of international crime control.""l  The
"political offense exception"14 now protects political nonconformists.
This exception assumes that political crimes do not violate international
law and thus precludes the extradition of alleged political offenders. 5
Because each nation defines political offenses according to its own legal
system, 16 the exception operates as a major obstacle to the extradition of
terrorists. Terrorists employ increasingly violent tactics, which ordina-
rily would fall outside of the political offense exception, to accomplish
political goals.17 These goals thus serve to shield otherwise criminal ac-
tions from extradition.
Legal scholars, in an attempt to narrow the scope of the political of-
fense exception, have distinguished "pure" political offenses from "rela-
tive" offenses. Pure political offenses, such as treason and espionage,
involve non-violent actions, which do not victimize private citizens, di-
rected against incumbent governments. 8 Most nations find that such
United States v. Ranscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), or any crime arising out of the same circumstances if
the additional offense is also extraditable, see I. SHEARER, supra note 9, at 146-47. Finally, extradi-
tion treaties may exclude citizens of the requested nation from extradition. See, eg., Extradition
Treaty, Jan. 13, 1961, United States-Brazil, 15 U.S.T. 2093, T.I.A.S. No. 5691.
12. Research In International Law Under the Auspices of the Harvard Law School, L Extradi-
tion, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 15, 35-37, 108 (1935) (political and religious non-conformists were viewed as
dangerous to the stability of all nations).
13. Skelding & Sternberg, State Department Determinations of Political Offenses: Death Knell
for the Political Offense Exception in Extradition Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 137, 138 (1983).
14. The "political offense exception" refers to treaty provisions in which nations reserve the
right to refuse to extradite political offenders. V. WINGAERT, supra note 5, at 1 n.1. For a compre-
hensive list of such treaties, see id. at 1 n.2.
15. See Skelding & Sternberg, supra note 13, at 138-39 (noting that western society accepts
political rebellion against oppression and views the offender as posing a threat only to his own gov-
ernment). See also V. WIJNGAERT, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that political offenses are not inher-
ently criminal because the offender acts out of a sense of social consciousness).
16. See V. WIJNGAERT, supra note 5, at 47. See also 4 FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: Docu-
MENTS OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL 87 (1984) (documenting state-sponsored international terror-
ism and noting that defining extraditable political "crimes" becomes impossible in the face of such
state support).
17. See Note, Politics of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 617, 634 (1981) (political
terrorism has changed its focus from traditional governmental targets to innocent civilians).
18. Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States: 1981-1983, 17 AKRON L.
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activities fall within the traditional political offense category and refuse
to extradite the offenders.
Relative political offenses, by contrast, involve acts traditionally con-
sidered criminal, but which derive a political flavor from the surrounding
circumstances or the offender's political motivation. 19 Relative political
offenders, including terrorists, have forced nations to reevaluate their ex-
tradition policies.20 In response, many nations have adopted an exclu-
sionary approach to extradition designed to protect legitimate political
activism and control purely terrorist tactics. Under this approach, extra-
dition treaties expressly exclude certain acts, such as war crimes and hi-
jacking, from coverage under the political offense exception.21 In
adopting an exclusionary approach, the party nations assume that the
seriousness of certain crimes outweighs the values that the political of-
fense exception protects.22
All treaties, however, do not contain exclusionary provisions, and all
nations do not willingly extradite individuals who have committed acts
that would be excluded from the political offense exception under such
provisions. Some governments and commentators have expressed a fear
that a concerted "war" on terrorism will quash the legitimate political
activities of dissident and separatist groups.23 In addition, many nations
REV. 495 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Extradition Reform]. "Pure" political offenses also include
sedition, conspiracy to overthrow the government, prohibited speech or press, and unlawful assem-
bly. Id. at 549.
19. Id. See also FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 84.
20. See Final Document, Conference on Terrorism and Political Crimes, 30, Syracuse, Sicily,
1973; INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 2, at XII (attempting to distinguish between "legiti-
mate rebellion and indiscriminate terror tactics"), cited in Skelding & Sternberg, supra note 13, at
171 n.213. But see V. WUNGAERT, supra note 5, at 24 n.127 (noting that any terrorist act can be
justified on political grounds).
This reevaluation generally involves an attempt to define terrorism. Nations have defined specific
criminal acts as terrorism per se. See International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,
G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), reprinted in
18 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1456 (1979).
21. See, eg., Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227;
Supplementary Treaty, June 25, 1985 (defining political offense to exclude aircraft highjacking, hos-
tage taking, murder and kidnapping among others). Other treaties exclude genocide, apartheid, and
drug offenses. See Extradition Reform, supra note 18, at 550.
22. See FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 86 (noting that this perception led to the 1970
Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and to a general reappraisal
of the political offense exception).
23. See E. EVANS, CALLING A TRUCE TO TERROR 97 (1979). A coalition of Arab, Asian,
African and communist States opposed a 1972 Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment
of Certain Acts of International Terrorism, 27 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.850 (1972), re-
printed in 67 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 431 (1972). The nations feared that "action against terrorism
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss4/7
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view state-sponsored terrorism as the only effective method for overcom-
ing threats to their national autonomy.24 Finally, application of the polit-
ical offense exception has lacked consistency, creating additional barriers
to easy extradition.2"
II. KIDNAPPING AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO EXTRADITION
A. United States Law and Jurisdictional Barriers
In light of the problems inherent in formal extradition procedures, kid-
napping appears as an attractive, expedient alternative means of bringing
terrorists to justice.26 Nevertheless, some barriers to the use of kidnap-
ping for such purposes do exist. Before it may criminally prosecute any
individual the United States government must establish subject-matter
and personal jurisdiction. United States courts have had little trouble
finding that they possess jurisdiction over kidnapped offenders.
1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The Government can establish subject-matter jurisdiction over alleged
terrorists under several alternative theories. Subject-matter jurisdiction
exists over non-resident aliens whose acts have deleterious effects within
could potentially interfere with wars of national liberation." E. EVANS, supra, at 97. See also 1
FRIEDLANDER, supra note 16, at 45-46 n.110 (statement of Zendi Labib Terzi, the PLO's chief
observer at the United Nations, that "[v]iolence is an essential part of a liberation movement.")
(citing Kirk, PLO's Mild-Mannered Aggressor, Chicago Tribune, April 4, 1976, § 2 at 2, col. 4).
The United Nations has occasionally condoned terrorism in the context of national liberation
movements. See, e.g., Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against
Criminal and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, G.A. Res. 3103 (xxvii), 28 U.N. Doe. A/9102
(1973).
24. See 4 FRIEDLANDER, supra note 16, at 87 (noting that many states refuse to condemn state-
sponsored terrorism when used as an anti-imperialist tool). See also E. EVANS, supra note 23, at 101
(arguing that terrorism is a political rather than humanitarian issue to many United Nation member
states).
25. The decisions of United States courts demonstrate the sometimes arbitrary attempts to de-
fine the political offense exception. Compare In re Mackin, Mag. No. 80 Cr. Misc. (S.D.N.Y.) (refus-
ing to extradite member of Irish Republican Army charged with planting a bomb that injured a
British soldier at a bus station), appeal denied, 688 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981) with Eain v. Wilkes, 641
F.2d 504 (7th Cir.) (allowing extradition of a member of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
charged with planting a bomb in an Israeli market that killed or injured thirty-eight people), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
These conflicting decisions provided the impetus for the introduction of several extradition reform
bills in Congress. See Extradition Reform Bills See the Light, 6 Nat'l L.J., Dec. 12, 1983, at 14, col.
I.
26. See Post Dispatch, supra note 1. See also Fighting Fire with Fire: The Extralegal War, St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, April 10, 1986, § B, at 2, col. 1.
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the United States27 or injure a national interest,28 whether or not those
acts are actually committed within the United States. In addition,
United States courts possess penal jurisdiction when the alleged of-
fender 29 or the victim of the offense30 is a United States citizen. Finally,
the perpetrators of certain offenses are considered universal enemies,
which any nation has the right to prosecute. 31 These principles make a
finding of subject-matter jurisdiction relatively perfunctory in most cases.
2. Personal Jurisdiction
In Ker v. Illinois,3 2 the Supreme Court first considered the propriety of
government-sanctioned kidnapping as a means to obtain personal juris-
diction. In Ker, the defendant committed a larceny in Illinois and fled to
Peru. A United States messenger kidnapped the defendant and forcibly
returned him to Illinois to stand trial.3a The Court rejected Ker's claim
that he had been denied due process of law. 34 The Court held that a fair
trial in itself satisfies due process,35 and "irregularities in the manner in
which [the defendant] may be brought into the custody of the law" are
insufficient to defeat jurisdiction.36
In Frisbie v. Collins,37 the Court reaffirmed its Ker holding in the con-
text of domestic kidnapping. Law enforcement agents kidnapped an al-
leged murderer in Chicago and returned him to Michigan to stand trial.38
The Court found that personal jurisdiction existed despite the highly un-
27. This principle is known as "objective territoriality." See Note, The Constitutional Rights of
Non-Resident.Aliens Prosecuted in the United States, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L. FORUM, 221, 223 (1980).
See also Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 5, at 89, 96-97 n.90.
28. This principle is known as the "protective principle." See Note, supra note 27, at 223 n.17.
29. This principle is known as "nationality." See Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 5, at 80
n.91-92.
30. This principle is known as the "passive personality" principle. Id. at 53 n.8.
31. This principle is known as "universality." Id. at 82 n.100.
32. 119 U.S. 436 (1889).
33. Id. at 438.
34. Id. at 442. Ker also alleged that his abduction violated the extradition treaty between the
United States and Peru. The Court found that Ker had no rights under the treaty. Id.
35. Id. at 440.
36. Id. The Court formally incorporated the maxim mala captus, bene detentus-an illegal
apprehension does not preclude jurisdiction-into American law. See Note, Constitutional and In.
ternational Kidnapping-Government Illegality as a Challenge to Jurisdiction, 50 TUL. L. REv. 169,
171 (1975).
37. 342 U.S. 519 (1951), reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952),
38. Id. at 520.
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orthodox manner the state had used to bring the defendant to trial.3 9
In United States v. Toscanino,4° the Second Circuit suggested that
some limits to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine exist. American agents abducted
Toseanino in Uruguay, transported him to Brazil, tortured him for three
weeks, drugged him and flew him to the United States to stand trial for
conspiring to import drugs.41 The court noted that recent Supreme
Court opinions had expanded the due process protections afforded crimi-
nal defendants.42 The court concluded that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
could not be reconciled with this expansion, and due process "protects
the accused against pretrial illegality by denying the government the
fruits of its exploitation of any deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness on
its part. 43
In the following year, however, the Second Circuit narrowed its Tos-
canino holding. In United States ex reL Lujan v. Gengler,4 the court
held that, absent allegations of torture or brutality, abduction alone was
insufficient to divest the court of jurisdiction.45 The court recognized the
existence of some limits on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, but stated that it
would tolerate some irregularity in the circumstances leading to an ac-
cused's presence in the jurisdiction.46 The court restricted the applica-
tion of Toscanino to instances of "shocking governmental conduct."'4 7
Thus, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine remains well entrenched in American ju-
risprudence, allowing courts to exercise personal jurisdiction despite un-
orthodox rendition. 4 Personal jurisdiction requirements, therefore, do
39. Id. at 522. The Court again held that due process is satisfied if the government apprises the
defendant of the charges and the defendant receives a fair trial. Id.
40. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (1974).
41. Id. at 270-71.
42. Id. at 275. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 169 (1952). In Rochin, the Supreme Court
broadened its due process interpretation and held inadmissible evidence obtained through an illegal
search and seizure. Id. at 173. The Rochin holding cast some doubt on the continued validity of the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine. See Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over Fugitives Brought from
a Foreign Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND. L.J. 427 (1957).
43. 500 F.2d at 275. See also United States v. Edinous, 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970) (question-
ing continued validity of Ker-Frisbie doctrine); Government of Virgin Islands v. Ortiz, 427 F.2d
1043, 1045 n.2 (3d Cir. 1970) (noting that "the validity of the Frisbie doctrine had been seriously
questioned because it condones illegal police conduct").
44. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
45. Id. at 66.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975) (distinguishing Toscanino and
finding jurisdiction because Chilean police, not United States agents, abducted and tortured the de-
Number 4] 1211
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not presently represent an obstacle to the kidnapping of terrorists.
B. International Agreements as Legal Barriers to State-Sponsored
Kidnapping
Currently, United States courts refuse to find that extradition treaties
and other international agreements permit individual defendants to ob-
ject to the use of kidnapping as an alternative to extradition. In United
States v. Cordero,49 the First Circuit held that a criminal defendant lacks
standing to challenge a violation of formal extradition procedures.50 In
Cordero, Panamanian officials seized the defendant at the behest of
United States agent and returned him to Puerto Rico to stand trial for
conspiracy to import cocaine.5 1 The procedure employed differed signifi-
cantly from the one provided by the United States-Panamanian extradi-
tion treaty. 2 Nevertheless, the court concluded that "extradition treaties
are made for the benefit of the governments concerned," and a defendant
has no right to complain of treaty violations. 3
Similarly, in Lujan, the defendant claimed that his abduction violated
the charters of the United Nations and Organization of American
States.54 The court stated that the provisions allegedly violated protect
the sovereignty of nations and, in the absence of an objection by an of-
fended state, a violation cannot occur.5 - The court distinguished Tos-
canino, in which the defendant had made a similar argument, on the
ground that the offended state had itself condemned such methods of
apprehension. 6 The Lujan court suggested that a defendant could suc-
fendant); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.) (rejecting Toscanino), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1001 (1975).
49. 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1982).
50. Id. at 37-38.
51. Id. at 32.
52. Id. at 37.
53. Id. at 37-38. The court also noted that nothing in the treaties required the countries to
follow the procedures provided. Id. The defendant also sought to rely on Toscanino. The court,
however, held that the Toscanino exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine applies only if there is egre-
gious conduct by United States agents. Id. at 37.
54. 510 F.2d at 66. Both documents recognize territorial integrity as inviolable. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 2, para. 5 (obligating members to "refrain ... from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State"); Charter of the Organization of
American States, opened for signature April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361 at art. 17
("the territory of a State is inviolable").
55. 510 F.2d at 67.
56. Id. The court noted that Lujan's failure to allege that either Argentina or Bolivia protested
his abduction "is fatal to his reliance upon the charters." Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss4/7
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cessfully claim a defense based on a violation of international law if the
offended state registered an official protest with the United States De-
partment of State.57 The court noted that even a treaty granting a spe-
cific benefit, such as fishing rights, allows redress only through the
state.58
Thus, Lujan and Condero makes clear that current judicial interpreta-
tions of international agreements and extradition treaties accept kidnap-
ping as a legal alternative to extradition.
III. OBJECTIONS TO THE LEGITIMACY OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED
KIDNAPPING
Current judicial analyses of the legality of kidnapping as a means to
acquire jurisdiction ignore five important arguments against the legiti-
macy of this practice. Arguably, courts attending to even one of these
arguments would be forced to find that state-sponsored kidnapping,
although effective, is not a legal alternative to extradition.
A. Legal Objections to Government-Sponsored Kidnapping
1. Avoidance of Extraordinary Measures
The first of these arguments arises from the legal principle that prohib-
its resort to extraordinary measures until ordinary means fail.5 9 This
principle would prohibit the use of kidnapping to obtain jurisdiction until
extradition procedures have been attempted without success. Although
this principle appears to bar the kidnapping of terrorists, the fact that the
political offense exception makes extradition utterly futile in many situa-
tions limits the principle's applicability.'
2. Lawful Jurisdiction Must Flow From Lawful Means
Courts sanctioning kidnapping as a means to acquire personal jurisdic-
tion also overlook the legal maxim that a lawful situation cannot arise
57. Id. at 67 n.8.
58. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115 (1965)).
59. This principle is a direct translation of the Roman maxim, "Nunquam decurritur ad ex-
traordinarium sed ubi deficit ordinarium." See INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 2, § 5-1.
60. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
Number 4] 1213
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from an unlawful one.6 Thus, an illegal abduction cannot result in a
valid assertion of personal jurisdiction. The force of this argument, as
applied to state-sponsored kidnapping, depends upon whether abducting
and transporting a person across national borders is technically illegal
under international law.62 American courts have refused to recognize
international agreements as bars to personal jurisdiction in such cases.63
Nevertheless ample authority exists for the proposition that such abduc-
tions are at least disfavored, if not prohibited, by customary international
law. International abduction violates the sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity of the asylum state, thus contravening a fundamental tenet of cus-
tomary international law." The United Nations has codified this
principle of customary international law and specifically condemns
kidnapping. 65
3. Implications from International Law
The third objection to the use of international kidnapping to acquire
jurisdiction follows from the second. The United States, as a member of
the United Nations and a dominant world power, presumably has a re-
sponsibility to respect the sovereignty of other nations and abide by the
tenets of customary international law.66 If United States courts should
61. This principle is based on the Roman legal maxim, "ex injuria ius non oritur." See INTER-
NATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 2, at § 5-1.
While most legal scholars disapprove of courts asserting jurisdiction obtained through illegal
means there is not apparent judicial trend toward abolishing the practice. See, e.g., id. at V § 4-18;
V. WUNGAERT, supra note 5, at 61.
62. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
64. See I. SHEARER, supra note 9, at 75 ("abduction is such a manifestly extralegal act, and in
practice so hazardous and uncertain, that it is unworthy of serious consideration as an alternative
method to extradition in securing custody of fugitive offenders.") Even United States courts have
found that international abduction violates a "long-standing principle of international law," territo-
rial integrity. See Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 277-78.
65. The best-known United Nations condemnation of kidnapping was a resolution issued on the
abduction of Adolph Eichmann, an accused Nazi war criminal. Israel sent "volunteers" to Argen-
tina to kidnap Eichmann and bring him back to Israel to stand trial for his alleged war crimes.
Eichmann was kidnapped, tried, convicted, and hung in Israel. Argentina protested the kidnapping
as violative of its sovereignty. The United Nations Security Council condemned kidnapping and said
the practice would only create an atmosphere of insecurity and distrust which is incompatible with
world peace. See 15 U.N. SCOR (868th mtg.) 1, U.N. Doc. s/p.v. 868 (1960).
66. The United Nations Charter (Department of State, Treaties in Force 402-03 (1973)) obli-
gates all members "to refrain ... from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State ...." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 5.
The United States is also a member of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.). The O.A.S.
Charter (Department of State, Treaties in Force 359 (1973)) provides that "the territory of a State is
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss4/7
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hold, in light of this responsibility, that international kidnapping violates
international law, they must then determine the extent to which federal
law incorporates international law.67 The Supreme Court some eighty
years ago in The Paquette Habana,68 held that customary international
law governs unless preempted by a contrary federal statute. No federal
statute recognizes kidnapping as a legal alternative to extradition nor has
the validity of the Supreme Court holding ever been questioned. Conse-
quently, American courts should incorporate the international-law pro-
hibition on kidnapping into our national jurisprudence.
B. Policy Objections to Government-Sponsored Kidnapping
L Human Rights Concerns
Courts accepting the legitimacy of international kidnapping also ig-
nore the increased focus on human rights in the world and domestic are-
nas, which demands a broader definition of individual due process rights.
American courts, although recognizing constitutional due process guar-
antees in international kidnapping cases, largely overlook internationally
protected human rights.69 The United Nations Charter,7" the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,7 and various multilateral treaties 72 all
inviolable, it may not be the object even temporarily, ... of... measures of force taken by another
State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever .... " See Charter of the Organization of
American States, opened for signature, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361 at art. 17.
67. Even if international kidnapping violates international law, American courts need not in-
corporate international legal standards unless the Supreme Court so mandates. Treaties, however,
are constitutionally incorporated into federal law. U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
68. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). The Supreme Court stated:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
Courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations ....
Id. at 700.
69. See supra notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
70. U.N. Charter art. 1(3), 13(l)(b), 55(c), 62(2) (provisions specifically referring to respect for
human rights as an international State obligation). See generally M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at V
§ 5-1 (discussing state responsibility under human rights provisions).
71. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), 10 Dec. 1948 (guaranteeing "the right to life, liberty, and the secur-
ity of persons").
72. See, eg., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI),
Dec. 16, 1966 (guaranteeing right to liberty and freedom of person for citizens and aliens); the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 262; The InterAmerican Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.
Official Records Serv. XVI/1.1 Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1 (Jan. 7, 1970).
Washington University Open Scholarship
1216 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 64:1205
guarantee universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
These rights include "the right to life, liberty, and security of persons"
and freedom from "arbitrary arrest, detention or exile."73 Even where
international charters, agreements and treaties do not explicitly ensure
due process rights, courts should interpret human rights provisions in
these documents as implicit guarantees of such rights. Although courts
have refused to recognize private causes of action based upon interna-
tional law,74 they should extend these implicit due process protections to
individual defendants who are subject to state prosecution. Courts
should view such protections as self-executing components of interna-
tional agreements.
2. Respect for Territorial Sovereignty
The failure of courts ruling on the validity of international kidnapping
to consider such acts as possible affronts to territorial sovereignty is egre-
gious and potentially dangerous. Respect for territorial sovereignty is
crucial to the maintenance of world order, and disregard for the territo-
rial integrity of other nations invites disregard for our own sovereignty
and the rights of our citizens.
Courts should interpret international agreements and treaties that rec-
ognize the inviolate territorial sovereignty of the party nations as implicit
prohibitions against actions, such as kidnapping, which fail to respect
that sovereignty.75 At a minimum, courts should place the burden on the
prosecuting government to prove acquiesence by the asylum nation
amounting to compliance with international law.76 In the absence of
such proof, courts should refuse to exercise jurisdiction.
Such an approach to international law would encourage the govern-
ment to pursue ordinary extradition means before resorting to the ex-
traordinary. In addition, such an approach would encourage
international agreements and treaties. Countries desiring the United
States to hold their sovereignty involate could further that desire through
treaty provisions or international accords. Moreover, this approach
73. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 3 & 9.
74. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text. See also Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that the human rights provisions of the U.N.
Charter do not provide a basis for a private lawsuit).
75. The court in Lujan suggested that an objection by the violated state would have allowed the
court to find a violation of international law. 510 F.2d at 67.
76. See id. In Lujan the court noted that "consent or acquiesence by the offended state...
heals any violation of international law." Id.
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strikes a balance between the need to respect world order and territorial
sovereignty and the need to bring alleged terrorists to justice. Although
terrorists have attempted to manipulate the extradition process, United
States courts should not recognize lawful jurisdiction obtained through
unlawful means.
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